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Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium

Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises originates from a firm's future competitive rents. In equilibrium, heterogeneous firms are heterogeneously constrained, and competitive rents are inefficiently concentrated at the top. I explore several policy and empirical implications of this result. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium

The Rand Journal of Economics , Volume 50 (1) – Mar 1, 2019

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References (103)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
"© 2019 The RAND Corporation"
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12264
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises originates from a firm's future competitive rents. In equilibrium, heterogeneous firms are heterogeneously constrained, and competitive rents are inefficiently concentrated at the top. I explore several policy and empirical implications of this result.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Mar 1, 2019

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