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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2016 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12122
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We use a mechanism‐design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade‐off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first‐best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second‐best mechanism and find that it may include a “motivational bias,” that is, a bias in favor of the team's initially preferred project, and higher‐than‐optimal effort by uninformed team members.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Feb 1, 2016