Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Property Rights and the Environment in Pastoral China: Evidence from the Field

Property Rights and the Environment in Pastoral China: Evidence from the Field It is widely perceived that the degradation of China’s rangelands has accelerated since the introduction of rural reforms in the late 1970s. The popular explanation for this phenomenon has been that a ‘tragedy of the commons’ exists, as privately‐owned livestock are being grazed on ‘common’ land. Since the passing of the Rangeland Law in 1985, Chinese pastoral tenure policy has emphasized the establishment of individual household tenure as a necessary condition for improving incentives for sustainable rangeland management. Yet household tenure has yet to be effectively established in many pastoral regions. The first objective of this article is to describe pastoral tenure arrangements in northern Xinjiang‐Uygur Autonomous Region. Its second objective is to explain pastoral tenure arrangements, particularly the observed persistence of collective action. It is argued that there is no ‘tragedy of the commons’ and that it is characteristics of rangeland resources and the social environment that give rise to the particular types of institutional arrangements found. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Development and Change Wiley

Property Rights and the Environment in Pastoral China: Evidence from the Field

Development and Change , Volume 32 (4) – Sep 1, 2001

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/property-rights-and-the-environment-in-pastoral-china-evidence-from-4QBMWk3BAu

References (52)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Institute of Social Studies 2001
ISSN
0012-155X
eISSN
1467-7660
DOI
10.1111/1467-7660.00223
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

It is widely perceived that the degradation of China’s rangelands has accelerated since the introduction of rural reforms in the late 1970s. The popular explanation for this phenomenon has been that a ‘tragedy of the commons’ exists, as privately‐owned livestock are being grazed on ‘common’ land. Since the passing of the Rangeland Law in 1985, Chinese pastoral tenure policy has emphasized the establishment of individual household tenure as a necessary condition for improving incentives for sustainable rangeland management. Yet household tenure has yet to be effectively established in many pastoral regions. The first objective of this article is to describe pastoral tenure arrangements in northern Xinjiang‐Uygur Autonomous Region. Its second objective is to explain pastoral tenure arrangements, particularly the observed persistence of collective action. It is argued that there is no ‘tragedy of the commons’ and that it is characteristics of rangeland resources and the social environment that give rise to the particular types of institutional arrangements found.

Journal

Development and ChangeWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2001

There are no references for this article.