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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2014 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12067
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2014