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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2011, RAND.
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00134.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and provides an alternative explanation for the stylized fact, in many settings, that most agents are compliant most of the time even though audit rates and expected penalties are low.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2011