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Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America

Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America Does it matter that working‐class citizens are numerically underrepresented in political offices throughout the world? For decades, the conventional wisdom in comparative politics has been that it does not, that lawmakers from different classes think and behave roughly the same in office. In this article, we argue that this conclusion is misguided. Past research relied on inappropriate measures of officeholders’ class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices. Using data on 18 Latin American legislatures, we show that lawmakers from different classes bring different economic attitudes to the legislative process. Using data on one least likely case, we also show that pre‐voting decisions like sponsoring legislation often differ dramatically along social class lines, even when political parties control higher‐visibility decisions like roll‐call votes. The unequal numerical or descriptive representation of social classes in the world's legislatures has important consequences for the substantive representation of different class interests. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©2015 by the Midwest Political Science Association
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12112
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Does it matter that working‐class citizens are numerically underrepresented in political offices throughout the world? For decades, the conventional wisdom in comparative politics has been that it does not, that lawmakers from different classes think and behave roughly the same in office. In this article, we argue that this conclusion is misguided. Past research relied on inappropriate measures of officeholders’ class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices. Using data on 18 Latin American legislatures, we show that lawmakers from different classes bring different economic attitudes to the legislative process. Using data on one least likely case, we also show that pre‐voting decisions like sponsoring legislation often differ dramatically along social class lines, even when political parties control higher‐visibility decisions like roll‐call votes. The unequal numerical or descriptive representation of social classes in the world's legislatures has important consequences for the substantive representation of different class interests.

Journal

American Journal of Political ScienceWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2015

References