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Risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons

Risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons In this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered. It is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect. In the Nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region, however, which corresponds to the policies of the central authority. Regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation. It is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely. JEL Classification: H77, E61, and F36. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne D'économique Wiley

Risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons

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References (21)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0008-4085
eISSN
1540-5982
DOI
10.1111/0008-4085.00035
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered. It is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect. In the Nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region, however, which corresponds to the policies of the central authority. Regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation. It is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely. JEL Classification: H77, E61, and F36.

Journal

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne D'économiqueWiley

Published: Aug 1, 2000

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