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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2013 the editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics .
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12036
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 2013