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Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts

Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in‐house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions, subcontracting decisions, and bidding distortions. In conclusion, I propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts

The Rand Journal of Economics , Volume 45 (4) – Jan 1, 2014

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References (77)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2014 The RAND Corporation
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12068
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in‐house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions, subcontracting decisions, and bidding distortions. In conclusion, I propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2014

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