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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2021 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12371
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2021