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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- 2007 RAND
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00078.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Many organizations are structured so that workers are jointly accountable for performance, even though there exist alternative organizational structures that align incentive compensation more closely with each worker's tasks. I develop a multitask agency model that demonstrates that such organizations may be optimal when multitask problems are severe or risk considerations are not too important. I also show that, in some circumstances, it may be optimal to share poorly measured tasks among several agents, contrary to the results of the existing multitask literature.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2007