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The bidder exclusion effect

The bidder exclusion effect We introduce a new, simple‐to‐compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric, conditionally independent private values. The test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random, which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics. This object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers. We illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions, where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

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References (107)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
"© 2019 The RAND Corporation"
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12263
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We introduce a new, simple‐to‐compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric, conditionally independent private values. The test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random, which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics. This object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers. We illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions, where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Mar 1, 2019

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