Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Elijah Iii, William Jackson, Iii, Robert Eisenbeis, Robert Connolly, Timothy Hannan, David Ravenscraft, Stephen Rhoades, Richard Mcenally, Kathryn Moran (2004)
Working Paper Series the " Risk-adjusted " Price-concentration Relationship in Banking the " Risk-adjusted " Price-concentration Relationship in Banking
U. Doraszelski, Sarit Markovich (2008)
Advertising dynamics and competitive advantageThe RAND Journal of Economics, 38
Yongmin Chen, M. Riordan (2007)
Price and Variety in the Spokes ModelWiley-Blackwell: Economic Journal
Johannes Hörner (2004)
A Perpetual Race to Stay AheadThe Review of Economic Studies, 71
Heski Bar-Isaac (2005)
Imperfect competition and reputational commitmentEconomics Letters, 89
Lyndon Moore, Narly Dwarkasing, F. Braggion (2011)
From Competition to Cartel: Bank Mergers in the U.K. 1885 to 1925Banking & Insurance eJournal
N. Economides (1989)
Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product marketsJournal of Economic Theory, 47
Luís Cabral, M. Riordan (1994)
The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory PricingEconometrica, 62
T. Beck, A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine (2006)
Bank concentration, competition, and crises: First resultsJournal of Banking and Finance, 30
Cabral Cabral (2002)
Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency EffectJournal of Economic Theory, 102
Leemore Dafny, M. Duggan, S. Ramanarayanan (2009)
Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance IndustryLabor: Personnel Economics eJournal
Brewer Brewer, Jackson Jackson (2006)
A Note on the ?Risk Adjusted? Price?Concentration Relationship in BankingJournal of Banking & Finance, 30
Thorsten Beck (2008)
Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Friends or Foes?Monetary Economics
Franklin Allen (1984)
Reputation and Product QualityThe RAND Journal of Economics, 15
Yongmin Chen, M. Riordan (2008)
Price‐increasing competitionThe RAND Journal of Economics, 39
Kai Konrad, D. Kovenock (2006)
Multi-Battle ContestsBehavioral & Experimental Economics
E. Maskin, J. Tirole (1988)
Overview and quantity competition with large fixed costs
R. Rob, A. Fishman (2005)
Is Bigger Better? Customer Base Expansion through Word‐of‐Mouth ReputationJournal of Political Economy, 113
Aguirregabiria (2007)
Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete GamesEconometrica, 75
K. Schaeck, M. Čihák, S. Wolfe (2009)
Are Competitive Banking Systems More StableJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41
C. Budd, C. Harris, J. Vickers (1993)
A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?The Review of Economic Studies, 60
Luís Cabral (2000)
Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency EffectOrganizations & Markets eJournal
C. Harris, J. Vickers (1987)
Racing with UncertaintyThe Review of Economic Studies, 54
T. Eisenberg, J. Macey (2004)
Was Arthur Andersen Different?: An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large ClientsJournal of Empirical Legal Studies, 1
Amel (2004)
Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International EvidenceJournal of Banking & Finance, 28
Claessens Claessens, Laeven Laeven (2004)
What Drives Bank Competition? Some International EvidenceJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36
Rosen Rosen (1986)
Prizes and Incentives in Elimination TournamentsAmerican Economic Review, 76
B. Klein, K. Leffler (1981)
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual PerformanceJournal of Political Economy, 89
Konrad Konrad, Kovenock Kovenock (2009)
Multi?Battle ContestsGames and Economic Behavior, 66
Dana Dana, Fong Fong (2011)
Product Quality, Reputation, and Tacit CollusionInternational Economic Review, 5
R. Amir, Val Lambson (2003)
Entry, Exit, and Imperfect Competition in the Long Run
Maskin Maskin, Tirole Tirole (1988)
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly I IIEconometrica, 56
R. Amir, Val Lambson (2000)
On the Effects of Entry in Cournot MarketsThe Review of Economic Studies, 67
S. Rhoades, R. Rutz (1982)
Market power and firm risk: A test of the `quiet life' hypothesisJournal of Monetary Economics, 9
Christian Groh, B. Moldovanu, A. Sela, U. Sunde (2012)
Optimal seedings in elimination tournamentsEconomic Theory, 49
J. Maudos, J. Guevara (2003)
Factors Explaining the Interest Margin in the Banking Sectors of the European Union
G. Jin (2005)
Competition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of HMOs.The Rand journal of economics, 36 1
Jovanovic Jovanovic (1982)
Selection and the Evolution of IndustryEconometrica, 50
Moldovanu Moldovanu, Sela Sela (2006)
Contest ArchitectureJournal of Economic Theory, 126
Victor Aguirregabiria, P. Mira (2007)
Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete GamesIO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets
Chen Chen, Riordan Riordan (2007)
Price and Variety in the Spokes ModelEconomic Journal, 117
Dean Amel, C. Barnes, F. Panetta, C. Salleo (2003)
Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International EvidenceCEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series
P. Aghion, C. Harris, P. Howitt, J. Vickers (2001)
Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step InnovationThe Review of Economic Studies, 68
Johannes Hörner (2002)
Reputation and CompetitionThe American Economic Review, 92
S. Salop (1979)
Monopolistic competition with outside goodsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 10
Hugo Hopenhayn (1992)
Entry, exit, and firm dynamics in long run equilibriumEconometrica, 60
K. Lai, F. Gul (2008)
Was audit quality of Laventhol and Horwath poorJournal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27
T. Beck, A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine (2005)
Bank Concentration and Fragility. Impact and MechanicsNational Bureau of Economic Research
R. Ericson, A. Pakes (1995)
Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical WorkThe Review of Economic Studies, 62
Industry dynamics are studied as an endogenous tournament with infinite horizon and stochastic entry. In each period, firms’ investments determine their probability of surviving into the next period. This generates a survival contest, which fuels market structure dynamics, while the evolution of market structure constantly redefines the contest. More concentrated markets endogenously generate less profit, rivals that are more difficult to outlive, and more entry. The unique steady‐state distribution exhibits ongoing turbulence, correlated exit and entry rates, and shakeouts. The model’s predictions fit empirical findings in markets where firms trade off profits for smaller risk of failure (e.g., banking).
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2012
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.