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Most researchers assume legislators repay past favors to secure future rewards and avoid future punishments, but a growing literature shows that human beings are intrinsically motivated to reciprocate past favors. However, there is no systematic evidence as to whether legislators bring this preference for reciprocity to Congress. An original survey experiment, an observational study of end‐of‐career behavior, and a matching‐based analysis of responses to committee assignments provide consistent evidence that legislators have a preference for reciprocity.
American Journal of Political Science – Wiley
Published: Mar 13, 2023
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