# THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, COURT‐CURBING AND JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY ERRATUM

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, COURT‐CURBING AND JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY ERRATUM ERRATUM The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy Erratum Tom S. Clark Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Emory University tom.clark@emory.edu n “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and upon observing Court curbing. For ε < b < 2ε,there Judicial Legitimacy” (American Journal of Political exists a semi separating equilibrium in which the Court I Science 53 (4): 971-89 (2009)), there is a slight error probabilistically makes a constrained decision upon in the proof of Proposition 3. Specifically, Congress’s (C ’s) observing Court curbing. For b > 2ε, it was asserted payoff from deviating to a pure strategy, ( = L) = h there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the Court should be given by (1 − m)b − mb − ε. C ’s strategy never makes a constrained decision upon observing Court c c from playing a pure strategy ( = L) = l is given by curbing. The comparative static derived was that as b ε − b . Thus, the mixing probability that makes C indif- increases—as the Court and Congress become more ide- ferent between playing ( = H) = l and ( = H) = ologically divergent—the Court should be less likely to b −ε h is m = . This probability holds for all b > ε. Thus, make a constrained decision upon observing Court curb- the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 exists for ing. The algebraic correction reveals that the semi sepa- all b > ε. rating equilibrium holds for all b > ε, and the restriction Note that this correction does not affect the substan- that b < 2ε is not necessary. However, the probability tive interpretation of the model or the empirical impli- with which the Court makes an unconstrained decision b −ε cations derived. In the article, analysis was constrained upon observing Court curbing ( = h), m = ,isin- to the case where b < 2ε. Thus, for low values of p, creasing in b . Thus, the prediction that judicial restraint c c specifically p < 0.5, it was claimed that three equilibria in response to Court curbing should decrease as Congress exist. For b < ε, there exists a separating equilibrium becomes more ideologically divergent from the Court in which the Court always makes a constrained decision continues to hold. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 60, No. 1, January 2016, P. E1 2011, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00554.x E1 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

# THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, COURT‐CURBING AND JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY ERRATUM

, Volume 60 (1) – Jan 1, 2016
1 page

/lp/wiley/the-separation-of-powers-court-curbing-and-judicial-legitimacy-erratum-DoajywNSmS
Publisher
Wiley
©2016 by the Midwest Political Science Association
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00554.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

### Abstract

ERRATUM The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy Erratum Tom S. Clark Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Emory University tom.clark@emory.edu n “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and upon observing Court curbing. For ε < b < 2ε,there Judicial Legitimacy” (American Journal of Political exists a semi separating equilibrium in which the Court I Science 53 (4): 971-89 (2009)), there is a slight error probabilistically makes a constrained decision upon in the proof of Proposition 3. Specifically, Congress’s (C ’s) observing Court curbing. For b > 2ε, it was asserted payoff from deviating to a pure strategy, ( = L) = h there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the Court should be given by (1 − m)b − mb − ε. C ’s strategy never makes a constrained decision upon observing Court c c from playing a pure strategy ( = L) = l is given by curbing. The comparative static derived was that as b ε − b . Thus, the mixing probability that makes C indif- increases—as the Court and Congress become more ide- ferent between playing ( = H) = l and ( = H) = ologically divergent—the Court should be less likely to b −ε h is m = . This probability holds for all b > ε. Thus, make a constrained decision upon observing Court curb- the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 exists for ing. The algebraic correction reveals that the semi sepa- all b > ε. rating equilibrium holds for all b > ε, and the restriction Note that this correction does not affect the substan- that b < 2ε is not necessary. However, the probability tive interpretation of the model or the empirical impli- with which the Court makes an unconstrained decision b −ε cations derived. In the article, analysis was constrained upon observing Court curbing ( = h), m = ,isin- to the case where b < 2ε. Thus, for low values of p, creasing in b . Thus, the prediction that judicial restraint c c specifically p < 0.5, it was claimed that three equilibria in response to Court curbing should decrease as Congress exist. For b < ε, there exists a separating equilibrium becomes more ideologically divergent from the Court in which the Court always makes a constrained decision continues to hold. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 60, No. 1, January 2016, P. E1 2011, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00554.x E1

### Journal

American Journal of Political ScienceWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2016