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Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises

Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises This paper proposes a new taxonomy for classifying models of soft budget constraints which allows identification of two classes of models. Distinguishing between these classes of models is useful, as they yield SBCs in differing circumstances and have differing theoretical and policy implications. The taxonomy is used to motivate an area of economic theory in which SBC models can yield novel insights: the analysis of banking crises. A model is presented in which SBCs arising from creditor passivity have implications for the question of the appropriate policy for dealing with bad debts on troubled banks' balance sheets. The paper also compares the implications of the two classes of SBC models for the analysis of banking crises. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics of Transition and Institutional Change Wiley

Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
2577-6975
eISSN
2577-6983
DOI
10.1111/1468-0351.00036
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper proposes a new taxonomy for classifying models of soft budget constraints which allows identification of two classes of models. Distinguishing between these classes of models is useful, as they yield SBCs in differing circumstances and have differing theoretical and policy implications. The taxonomy is used to motivate an area of economic theory in which SBC models can yield novel insights: the analysis of banking crises. A model is presented in which SBCs arising from creditor passivity have implications for the question of the appropriate policy for dealing with bad debts on troubled banks' balance sheets. The paper also compares the implications of the two classes of SBC models for the analysis of banking crises.

Journal

Economics of Transition and Institutional ChangeWiley

Published: Mar 1, 2000

Keywords: ; ;

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