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Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.

Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S. Abstract We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne D'économique Wiley

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References (24)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0008-4085
eISSN
1540-5982
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01646.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.

Journal

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne D'économiqueWiley

Published: May 1, 2011

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