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This study examines how managers balance economic incentives and inter‐divisional equity considerations during transfer price negotiations. Our experiment shows that both buyers and sellers are willing to give up a significant amount of their profits to pursue a more equitable outcome (one that results in greater inter‐divisional profit equalisation). We also find that incorporating peer evaluation schemes into negotiators' formal incentive plans has both economic and social‐psychological impacts on negotiation behaviour, resulting in even greater inter‐divisional profit equalisation. While this outcome may seem ‘fairer’ to the individual managers, from the firms' perspective profit equalisation can obscure divisional performance, potentially leading to resource allocation inefficiencies.
Australian Accounting Review – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2009
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