Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/truthtelling-in-matching-markets-kRw9KSQgp0
References (55)
-
Michael Peters, A. Siow (2002)
Competing Premarital InvestmentsJournal of Political Economy, 110
-
K. Burdett, M. Coles (1997)
Marriage and ClassQuarterly Journal of Economics, 112
-
(1973)
A Theory of Marriage: Part I, -
Francis Bloch, Harl Ryder (2000)
Two-sided search, marriages, and matchmakersInternational Economic Review, 41
-
R. Shimer, Lones Smith (2000)
Assortative Matching and Search -
(2000)
Non-Transferable Utility, Games and Economic Behavior -
(2009)
Jobs Online -
Hiroyuki Adachi (2003)
A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utilityJ. Econ. Theory, 113
-
P. Kuhn, M. Skuterud (2002)
Internet Job Search and Unemployment DurationsLabor: Personnel Economics
-
Harold Cole, G. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite (1992)
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and GrowthJournal of Political Economy, 100
-
Joel Sobel, Nageeb Ali, Marco Battaglini, Andreas Blume, Antonio Cabrales, Ying Chen, Vincent Crawford, Stefano Demichelis, Wouter Dessein, Eddie Dekel, Navin Kartik, Kohei Kawamura, Chulyoung Kim, Young-Gwan Kim, Frédéric Koessler, David Miller, R. Myerson, Philip Neary, Lucas Siga, Ran Spiegler, Joel Watson, Kathryn Woolard
Giving and Receiving Advice * -
Hector Chade (1999)
Two-Sided Search and Perfect Segregation with Fixed Search CostsMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
Chris Bidner (2010)
A Spillover‐Based Theory of CredentialismWiley-Blackwell: Canadian Journal of Economics
-
Hector Chade (2006)
Matching with noise and the acceptance curseJ. Econ. Theory, 129
-
E. Bilancini, L. Boncinelli (2013)
Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utilityGames Econ. Behav., 82
-
Boyan Jovanovic (1979)
Job Matching and the Theory of TurnoverJournal of Political Economy, 87
-
E. Hopkins (2012)
JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION, OR BECKER MARRIED TO SPENCEJournal of the European Economic Association, 10
-
Eva Nagypal (2007)
Learning by Doing vs. Learning About Match Quality: Can We Tell Them Apart?The Review of Economic Studies, 74
-
V. Crawford, J. Sobel (1982)
STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSIONEconometrica, 50
-
Michael Pries (2004)
Persistence of Employment Fluctuations: A Model of Recurring Job LossThe Review of Economic Studies, 71
-
David Autor (2000)
Wiring the Labor MarketLabor: Supply & Demand
-
First version submitted -
Betsey Stevenson (2008)
The Internet and Job SearchEconomics of Networks
-
R. Myerson (1982)
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problemsJournal of Mathematical Economics, 10
-
Jerry Green, Nancy Stokey (1980)
A two-person game of information transmissionJ. Econ. Theory, 135
-
P. Kuhn, Hani Mansour (2014)
Is Internet Job Search Still Ineffective?Labor: Supply & Demand eJournal
-
Lones Smith (1997)
The Marriage Model with Search FrictionsJournal of Political Economy, 114
-
G. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, L. Samuelson (2011)
Pricing and Investments in Matching MarketsMicroeconomics: Production
-
Harold Cole, G. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite (2001)
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large EconomiesJ. Econ. Theory, 101
-
Lones Smith (2011)
Frictional Matching ModelsAnnual Review of Economics, 3
-
Steven Matthews, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite (1991)
Refining cheap-talk equilibriaJournal of Economic Theory, 55
-
P. Chiappori, Murat Iyigun, Y. Weiss (2006)
Investment in Schooling and the Marriage MarketIZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series
-
Michael Pries, Richard Rogerson (2005)
Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and Labor Market FlowsJournal of Political Economy, 113
-
S. Gruneberg, G. Ive (2000)
Pricing and Investment -
Günter Hitsch, Ali Hortaçsu, D. Ariely (2008)
Matching and Sorting in Online DatingOrganizations & Markets eJournal
-
J. Eeckhout (1999)
Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity -
Nicolas Jacquet, Serene Tan (2007)
On the Segmentation of MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 115
-
V. Bhaskar, Ed Hopkins, Martin Cripps, Jan Eeckhout, T. Kornienko, B. Moldovanu, Mike Peters, Klaus Ritzberger, Arul Shankar, Balázs Szentes (2013)
Marriage as a Rat Race : Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching -
Harold Cole, G. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite (1998)
Efficient non-contractible investmentsStaff Report
-
P. Kuhn (2003)
New Economic Handbook -
Alp Atakan (2006)
Assortative Matching with Explicit Search CostsEconometrica, 74
-
M. Sattinger (1995)
Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to JobsInternational Economic Review, 36
-
(2006)
Advertising Content -
G. Menzio (2007)
A Theory of Partially Directed SearchJournal of Political Economy, 115
-
Robin Lee, M. Schwarz (2007)
Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets -
Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer, B. Moldovanu, A. Sela (2005)
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly SignalsMacroeconomics eJournal
-
J. McNamara, E. Collins (1990)
The job search problem as an employer–candidate gameJournal of Applied Probability, 27
-
M. Spence (1973)
Job Market SignalingQuarterly Journal of Economics, 87
-
Andriana Bellou (2015)
The impact of Internet diffusion on marriage rates: evidence from the broadband marketJournal of Population Economics, 28
-
Kyungmin Kim, Philipp Kircher (2012)
Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-Essentiality of Commitment in Market GamesCEPR Discussion Paper Series
-
Manuel Bagues, M. Labini (2007)
Do On-Line Labor Market Intermediaries Matter? The Impact of AlmaLaurea on the University-to-Work Transition -
Joseph Farrell (1993)
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk GamesGames and Economic Behavior, 5
-
(2005)
Search-theoretic models of the -
Kyungmin Kim, Philipp Kircher (2015)
Efficient Competition Through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing AuctionsEconometrica, 83
-
(2003)
The Internet and Matching in Labor Markets
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2017 The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12203
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We analyze a search and matching model with non‐transferable utility and asymmetric information. Randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase, at the end of which they discover each other's types and choose to match or not. Before deciding to enter this phase, agents can communicate through cheap talk. We provide conditions for this communication to be informative, and we examine how it affects agents' welfare. We show that communication is Pareto‐improving only when the matching is assortative in the absence of communication and left unchanged by information transmission.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 2017
Keywords: ; ; ; ; ; ; ;