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V. Smith (1965)
Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian HypothesisJournal of Political Economy, 73
(1986)
Simultaneous Trading in Two Competitive Markets: An Experimental Examination, technical report, Indiana University, Bloomington
Theodore Groves (1973)
Incentives in TeamsEconometrica, 41
James Cox, V. Smith, James Walker (1988)
Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctionsJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1
V. Smith (1981)
Experimental Economics at Purdue
J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, J. Tooby (1992)
The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture
V. Smith (2000)
Reflections on some experimental market mechanisms for classical environments
Smith Smith (1964)
Effect of Market Organization on Economic BehaviorQuarterly Journal of Economics, 87
Forsythe Forsythe, Horowitz Horowitz, Savin Savin, Sefton Sefton (1994)
Replicability, Fairness and Pay in Experiments with Simple Bargaining GamesGames and Economic Behavior, 6
V. Smith (1964)
Effect of Market Organization on Competitive EquilibriumQuarterly Journal of Economics, 78
V. Smith (2000)
Experimental methods in the political economy of exchange.Science, 234 4773
J. Kagel, A. Roth (1997)
Handbook of Experimental Economics
R. Isaac, C. Plott (1981)
Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental ExaminationThe American Economic Review, 71
P. Samuelson (1955)
Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public ExpenditureThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 37
Vicki Coppinger, V. Smith, J. Titus (1980)
INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED‐BID AUCTIONSEconomic Inquiry, 18
P. Klemperer (2001)
What Really Matters in Auction DesignCorporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal
Harstad Harstad, Marrese Marrese (1981)
Implementation of Mechanism by ProcessesJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2
Groves Groves (1973)
Incentives and TeamsEconometrica, 41
Smith Smith (1962)
An Experimental Study of Competitive Market BehaviorJournal of Political Economy, 70
V. Smith (1991)
Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and PsychologyJournal of Political Economy, 99
V. Smith, Arlington Williams (1982)
Effect of Rent Asymmetries in Experimental Auction Markets
S. Rassenti, V. Smith, R. Bulfin (1982)
A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot AllocationThe Bell Journal of Economics, 13
Patrick Joyce (1984)
The Walrasian Tâtonnement Mechanism and InformationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 15
(1994)
Replicability, Fairness and Pay in Experiments with Simple Bargaining Games, Games and Economic Behavior
(1991)
1991b), A Test that Discriminates Between Two Models of Single-object Auctions
V. Smith, Marc Knez (1987)
Hypothetical Valuations and Preference Reversals in the Context of Asset Trading
V. Smith (1977)
The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social ChoiceJournal of Political Economy, 85
J. Ledyard, John Roberts (1975)
On the Incentive Problem with Public Goods
J. Henrich, R. Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, Richard McElreath (2001)
In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale SocietiesThe American Economic Review, 91
T. Bergstrom, John Miller (1999)
Experiments with Economic Principles: Microeconomics
V. Smith (2000)
Bargaining and market behavior - essays in experimental economics
V. Smith (1980)
Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good DecisionsThe American Economic Review, 70
K. Wicksell (1958)
A New Principle of Just Taxation
V. Smith, Arlington Williams (1981)
On Nonbinding Price Controls in a Competitive MarketThe American Economic Review, 71
E. Chamberlin (1948)
An Experimental Imperfect MarketJournal of Political Economy, 56
(1991)
Bidding and auctioning institutions: Empirical results
V. Smith, James Cox, B. Roberson (1982)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions, 2
V. Smith (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: An Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision Mechanisms
L. Hurwicz (1977)
On informationally decentralized systems
E. Hoffman, K. McCabe, V. Smith (1996)
On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 25
(1937)
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Random House, New York; first published in 1776
V. Smith (1982)
Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental ScienceThe American Economic Review, 72
E. Lindahl (1958)
Just Taxation—A Positive Solution
W. Vickrey (1961)
Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed TendersJournal of Finance, 16
Ronald Harstad, M. Marrese (1981)
Implementation of mechanism by processes: Public good allocation experiments☆Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2
V. Smith, Arlington Williams (1982)
The effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction marketsJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3
Klemperer Klemperer (2002)
What Really Matters in Auction DesignJournal of Economic Perspectives, 16
T. Bergstrom, John Miller (1996)
Experiments With Economic Principles
Smith Smith (1977)
Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social ChoiceJournal of Political Economy, 85
L. Walras (1955)
Elements of Pure Economics, or The Theory of Social Wealth
V. Smith (2000)
Bargaining and Market Behavior
T. Bergstrom, C. Simon, C. Titus (1983)
Counting Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Via Degree Theory
(2002)
Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, technical report, School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, to appear as a chapter in C
V. Smith (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
E. Hoffman, K. McCabe, Keith Shachat, V. Smith (1994)
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
L. Cosmides, J. Tooby (1992)
Cognitive adaptations for social exchange.
Smith Smith, Williams Williams, Bratton Bratton, Vannoni Vannoni (1982)
Double Auctions vs Sealed Bid?Offer AuctionsAmerican Economic Review, 72
V. Smith (1982)
Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer AuctionsThe American Economic Review, 72
Corinne Bronfman, K. McCabe, D. Porter, S. Rassenti, V. Smith (1996)
An experimental examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement mechanism
K. McCabe, S. Rassenti (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Designing ‘Smart’ Computer-Assisted Markets
V. Smith, Arlington Williams (1982)
An Experimental Comparison of Alternative Rules for Competitive Market Exchange
(1982)
Bell Journal of Economics
David Porter, V. Smith (1994)
Stock Market Bubbles in the LaboratoryJournal of Behavioral Finance, 4
James Cox, V. Smith, James Walker (1984)
Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative AuctionsJournal of Finance, 39
Theodore Groves, J. Ledyard (1977)
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem'Econometrica, 45
Dhananjay Gode, S. Sunder (1993)
Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual RationalityJournal of Political Economy, 101
E. Clarke (1971)
Multipart pricing of public goodsPublic Choice, 11
Robert Forsythe, J. Horowitz, N. Savin, Martin Sefton (1994)
Fairness in Simple Bargaining ExperimentsGames and Economic Behavior, 6
K. Binmore, P. Klemperer (2002)
The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses
J. Banks, C. Plott, D. Porter (1988)
An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision MechanismsThe Review of Economic Studies, 55
Ross Miller, C. Plott, V. Smith (1977)
Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of SpeculationQuarterly Journal of Economics, 91
J. Bentham, J. Mill, Philip Wheelwright, James Mill (1935)
Jeremy Bentham : An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation
James Cox, James Walker (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions
(1989)
Designing smart computer-assisted markets: An experimental auction for gas networks
R. Musgrave, A. Peacock (1959)
Classics in the theory of public finance
V. Smith (1979)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Incentive Compatible Experimental Processes for the Provision of Public Goods
Vicki Coppinger, J. Titus (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions
J. Ledyard (1994)
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental ResearchPublic Economics
V. Smith, G. Suchanek, Arlington Williams (1988)
Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset MarketsEconometrica, 56
V. Smith (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Theory, Experiment and Economics
Joyce Joyce (1984)
The WalrasianTâtonnement, 15
(2001)
The Biggest Auction Ever : the Sale of the British 3 G Telecom Licences forthcoming
V. Smith (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: Frontmatter
V. Smith, James Walker (2000)
Monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics
David Porter, V. Smith (1995)
Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset MarketsThe Journal of Business, 68
V. Smith, Arlington Williams (2000)
The boundaries of competitive price theory: convergence, expectations, and transaction costs
Smith Smith (1989)
Theory, Experiment, and EconomicsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 3
I. Introduction If asked to produce a list of current economists whose work will most influence the development of economics over the next 50 years, I would put Vernon Smith's name close to the top. As Smith (1987) once remarked, economics has been traditionally considered an “observational” science like astronomy or meteorology, rather than an experimental science like physics or chemistry. The great accomplishment of Smith and his fellow experimentalists has been to convince the economics profession that economics can be an experimental science. A wide range of previously “untestable” propositions in economics become subject to empirical investigation once we realize that controlled laboratory experiments are possible. This has drastic implications for the attitude that we bring to our discipline. Smith (1989) describes this change: “… the training of economists conditions us to think of economics as an a priori science, and not as an observational science in which the interplay between theory and observation is paramount. Consequently, we come to believe that economic problems can be understood fully by just thinking about them.… But experimentation changes the way you think about economics… economics begins to represent concepts and propositions capable of being or failing to be demonstrated.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2003
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