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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2003 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2003.00002.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Wicksell's and Lindahl's ideas on public goods and decisions are reviewed in light of later developments in the theoretical economics literature. I begin by discussing their normative ideals, in particular the notion of justness, and the sources of the difficulties in reaching them. Wicksell's and Lindahl's ideal states, as well as the obstacles that they perceive, are compared to more recent views on free riding and on the behavior of elected representatives. Their views on political bargaining are then related to later concepts, in particular to the core of the economy.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2003