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References (9)
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Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value EffectJournal of Financial Intermediation, 12
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Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-Out PoliciesLSN: Empirical Studies (Law & Politics) (Topic)
- Publisher
- World Scientific Publishing Company
- ISSN
- 0217-5908
- eISSN
- 1793-6837
- DOI
- 10.1142/S0217590815501052
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Policy discussions are dominated by the view that governmental safety nets offered to banks cause moral hazard and encourage risk-taking. However, [Cordella, T and E Levy Yeyati (2003). Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 300–330.] proposed that government support offered during crises may increase bank franchise value, resulting in less risk-taking. This paper presents additional theoretical results on the franchise value effect. The franchise value effect can dominate over the moral hazard effect even when there are no specific crisis periods. The franchise value effect dominates if bank shareholders have a weak time preference and if the decision on the intensity of risk monitoring is a long-term choice.
Journal
The Singapore Economic Review – World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: Jun 1, 2018