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- Publisher
- World Scientific Publishing Company
- Copyright
- Copyright ©
- ISSN
- 0217-5908
- eISSN
- 1793-6837
- DOI
- 10.1142/S0217590811004183
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Asian firms frequently have to undercut domestic prices and subsidize switching costs in order to obtain a positive market share when entering European and the US markets. Such practices constitute dumping under Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We demonstrate that the mere existence of an administratively set minimum price, which is frequently used in assessing dumping allegations, protects domestic firms and has the effect of an additional entrance barrier for Asian firms. Consequently, competition policy should reassess GATT's antidumping regulation in order to keep markets open and domestic competition healthy.
Journal
The Singapore Economic Review – World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: Jun 1, 2011
Keywords: Industrial policy antidumping switching costs market entry