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- Publisher
- World Scientific Publishing Company
- Copyright
- Copyright ©
- ISSN
- 1793-9933
- eISSN
- 1793-9941
- DOI
- 10.1142/S179399331250010X
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that (i) the bail-out was a mistake, (ii) the political haggling over it was irrational. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU's present political-economic set-up, (i) the bail-out was unavoidable and (ii) the lengthy process of political haggling leading to it was understandable. We have based our analysis on a political-economic, game-theoretic model that helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended.
Journal
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy – World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: Jun 1, 2012
Keywords: Bail-out negative externality political economics game theory euro EMU JEL Classifications: E62 JEL Classifications: F33 JEL Classifications: H77 JEL Classifications: C70