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- Publisher
- World Scientific Publishing Company
- Copyright
- Copyright ©
- ISSN
- 0217-5908
- eISSN
- 1793-6837
- DOI
- 10.1142/S0217590811004201
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper investigates whether the relative-profit-maximization objective of private firms affects endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. Assuming firms have constant marginal costs and symmetric private firms are more efficient than the public firm, it is found that such an objective does not affect endogenous timing compared with the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a leader, social welfare increases compared with the level in the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a follower, social welfare remains unchanged.
Journal
The Singapore Economic Review – World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: Jun 1, 2011
Keywords: Mixed oligopoly endogenous timing Stackelberg relative profits